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Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance, and the 
subject of an enormous theoretical literature. Empirical evaluations of models of government 
formation tend to separate government formation per se, from the distribution of key government 
payoffs such as cabinet portfolios between members of the government that forms. Models of 
government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the 
government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not 
necessarily, specified ex postJLYHQNQRZOHGJHRIWKHLGHQWLW\RIVRPHJRYHUQPHQW³formateur´
or even of the full partisan composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart 
of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by 
canonical models of legislative bargaining, and the robust empirical regularity of proportional 
portfolio allocations ± ³*DPVRQ¶V /DZ´ :H UHVROYH WKLV FRQWUDGLFWLRQ E\ VSHFLI\LQJ DQG
estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution, which for example 
predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post. 
We conclude that canonical models of legislative bargaining do add to our ability to predict 
government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms 
UREXVWO\WRDSURSRUWLRQDOLW\QRUP«ZHsuggest because portfolio distribution follows the much 
more difficult process of policy bargaining in the typical government formation process.
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INTRODUCTION 
Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance. There is a 
large and heterodox theoretical literature dealing with this. Of special interest to political 
scientists, key ³RXWSXWV´RIWKHJRYHUQPHQWIRUPDWLRQSURFHVVIRUH[DPSOHSDUWisan composition 
of the cabinet and distribution of portfolios between cabinet members, as well as bargaining 
delays and cabinet durations, are easily and unambiguously observable. This enables a more 
clear-cut confrontation between theory and data than is typically the case in political science. It 
has also thrown into sharp relief a puzzle that Warwick and Druckman call the ³SRUWIROLR
DOORFDWLRQSDUDGR[´, a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet 
portfolios made by canonical alternating offers models of legislative bargaining, and the robust 
empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations that has been characterized as 
³*DPVRQ¶V/DZ´1 
Empirical models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any 
knowledge of the government that forms.2 Empirical models of the distribution of cabinet 
portfolios are typically specified ex post, given knowledge of the identity of some putative 
JRYHUQPHQW³formateur´RU the full partisan composition of the cabinet.3 We argue below that 
this disjunction lies at the heart of WKHSRUWIROLRDOORFDWLRQ³SDUDGR[´, and set out to resolve the 
paradox by specifying and estimating a joint ex ante model of cabinet formation and portfolio 
distribution. An important feature of such a joint model is that it treats the list of parties outside 
the cabinet as informative, predicting ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather 
                                                          
1
 (Warwick and Druckman 2006) 
2
 See for example  (Martin and Stevenson 2010; Martin and Stevenson 2001) 
3
 See for example  (Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Snyder et al. 2005; Warwick and Druckman 2001, 2006; 
Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013) 
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than taking this as given. Our joint model allows us to conclude that canonical models of 
legislative bargaining do add to our ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio 
distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm, giving 
support to recent ex ante theoretical models of portfolio distribution. 
RESOLVING THE PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION PARADOX 
The paradox  
The essential features of the portfolio allocation paradox have been extensively discussed by 
Warwick and Druckman among many others,4 and we confine ourselves here to its bare bones. A 
long tradition of empirical research linking legislative seat shares to distributions of cabinet 
positions originates in work published over 50 years ago by the sociologist William Gamson.5 
This established a strong and non-trivial empirical regularity, ³*DPVRQ¶V /DZ´ (GL). 
Government parties tend to receive cabinet portfolios in strict proportion to the legislative seats 
WKH\ FRQWULEXWH WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DJJUHJDWH VHDW WRWDO Gamson did not provide a formal 
bargaining model that yielded GL as a prediction. Indeed, if party leaders are motivated to 
PD[LPL]H ³*DPVRQiDQ´ proportional-to-seats) payoffs, the government coalition should 
command the smallest legislative seat total that is also a legislative majority. This is not true 
empirically, a finding first published over 40 years ago.6 Nonetheless, GL itself has proved 
extraordinarily robust to replication, even when different cabinet portfolios are assigned very 
                                                          
4
 (Bassi 2013; Carroll and Cox 2007a; Laver et al. 2011; Warwick and Druckman 2006; Falcó-Gimeno 
and Indridason 2013) 
5
 (Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Browne and Franklin 1973; Browne and Frendreis 1980; Fréchette et al. 
2005b; Gamson 1961; Laver et al. 2011; Schofield and Laver 1985; Warwick and Druckman 2006; 
Snyder et al. 2005) 
6
 (Fréchette et al. 2005a, 2005b; Taylor and Laver 1973) 
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different empirical weights.7 On the other side of the paradox we find canonical alternating 
offers models of legislative bargaining, with an intellectual pedigree traceable to Rubinstein 
(1982), adapted to legislative bargaining by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). This approach was 
applied explicitly to portfolio distribution by Ansolabehere et al., who derive two propositions 
about legislative bargaining over government formation in multi-party systems:8  
(1) ³(OHPHQWDU\PLFURHFRQRPLFWKHRU\WHDFKHVWKDWLQFRPSHWLWLYHVLWXDWLRQVSHUIHFW
VXEVWLWXWHVKDYHWKHVDPHSULFH«:HVKRZWKDWWKHQRQFRRSHUDWLYH bargaining 




coalition ± the formateur ± will receive a share of the cabinet posts that is much larger 
WKDQLWVVKDUHRIWKHYRWLQJZHLJKW´10 
On the face of things these two SURSRVLWLRQV VHHP FRQWUDGLFWRU\ ³SD\RIIV DUH SURSRUWLRQDO WR
voting weights´EXW³the formateur gets a payoff mucKODUJHUWKDQLWVVKDUHRIYRWLQJZHLJKW´
The apparent contradiction arises, because the first proposition is stated ex ante, absent 
knowledge of the identity of the formateur. The second proposition is stated ex post, knowing the 
identity of the formateur. The propositions are therefore not contradictory because they apply in 
                                                          
7
 (Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Browne and Franklin 1973; Browne and Frendreis 1980; Fréchette et al. 
2005b; Gamson 1961; Laver et al. 2011; Schofield and Laver 1985; Warwick and Druckman 2006; 
Snyder et al. 2005) 
8
 (Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Snyder et al. 2005) 
9
 (Snyder et al 2005: 982) 
10
 (Snyder et al 2005: 992) 
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different settings, but this highlights a critical distinction between ex ante and ex post models of 
cabinet portfolio distribution.  
Over and above the special position claimed for the formateur,  Ansolabehere et al. also 
diverge IURP W\SLFDO ZRUN RQ *DPVRQ¶V /DZ E\ DUJXLQJ WKDW FDELQHW SD\RIIV VKRXOG EH
DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKHRUHWLFDO YRWLQJ ZHLJKWV VSHFLILFDOO\ ³PLQLPXP LQWHJHU ZHLJKWV´ (MIWs), 
UDWKHUWKDQWKH³UDZ´legislative seat shares of each party. 3DUWLHV¶0,:Vare derived as follows 
from their raw seat shares and the winning threshold for passing votes in the legislature. Use the 
list of raw seat shares to calculate the list of winning coalitions. Now replace the raw seat shares 
with the list of smallest integers, one per party, generating the same set of winning coalitions. 
These integers are the parties¶ MIWs.11 Ansolabehere et al. therefore make two simultaneous 
moves away from traditional research on portfolio distribution. They propose a formateur 
advantage; and they propose using MIWs rather than raw seat shares. 
 Notwithstanding empirical findings published by Ansolabehere et al., analyses by 
subsequent authors show little if any empirical support for either of the two theoretical 
propositions stated above. In relation to the first ± use MIWs not raw seat shares ± Warwick and 
DruFNPDQ¶VUHVXOWVUHSOLFDWHGE\/DYHUHWDOare ³clear and strong: cabinet portfolios, in both 
number and value, are allocated in very close proportion to the seat contributions of cabinet 
parties, and the bargaining strengths of these parties distort this allocation principle only very 
VOLJKWO\RUYHU\RFFDVLRQDOO\´12 In relation to the second proposition, on the ex post formateur 
                                                          
11
 For example, in a 5-party 100-seat legislature with a simple majority winning threshold and a raw seat 
vector of (43, 35, 8, 8, 6), the MIW vector is (3, 1, 1, 1, 0). The smallest party has zero MIW because it is 
never pivotal; adding its seats never turns a losing coalition into a winning one. The largest party can 
form a winning coalition with any of the three middle parties; all three of the middle parties must combine 
to exclude the largest. 
12
 Warwick and Druckman (2006) p 659; Laver et al (2011). 
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effect, Warwick and Druckman (p659) find ³the power that ought to come with formateur status 
appears to yield little in terms of portfolios´. Laver et al. also show that estimating an ex post 
formateur effect is compounded by the methodological problem that formateur party status is 
coded endogenously in relevant datasets, as the party of the eventual prime minister.13 Thus 
Golder reports that ³it is not uncommon for the formateur to fail to form a coalition on the first 
or even the second attempt. As an example, it took seven different coalition proposals more than 
GD\VIRUDJRYHUQPHQWWRIRUPDIWHUWKH%HOJLDQOHJLVODWLYHHOHFWLRQV´14 None of these 
failed attempts by formateurs is analyzed by Snyder, et al., or by Warwick and Druckman, when 
they estimate the formateur advantage, and only one of 250 formateur parties in the dataset they 
use was not the party of the eventual prime minister.15 The prime ministerial portfolio thus 
appears on both sides of the relevant regressions, as one of the key independent variables 
(formateur status) and as part of the dependent variable (portfolio share). Correcting for this, 
Laver, et al. find that the empirical formateur effect disappears.16  
The paradox is therefore both simple and striking. As Carroll and Cox say, ³DOO modern 
bargaining PRGHOVSUHGLFWWKDW*DPVRQ¶V/DZshould not KROG´17  But, as Bassi says,³WKH most 
important empirical law in government-formation studies is that coalition partners share cabinet 
portfolios in proportion to their relative seat shares, which contradicts the predictions of the 
HQWLUHWKHRUHWLFDOOLWHUDWXUH´18  
 
                                                          
13
 (Laver et al. 2011) 
14
 (Golder 2010) (p8) 
15
 Snyder et al., 2005; Warwick and Druckman 2006 
16
 Laver et al., 2011 
17
 (Carroll and Cox 2007a) p 301. 
18
 (Bassi 2013) p778 
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Resolving the paradox 
Two theoretical questions underlie this paradox, as we have seen. The first is the claim that there 
is some formateur in a privileged bargaining position. The second is the claim that SDUWLHV¶
portfolio payoffs respond to their theoretical voting weights (MIWs) rather than their raw seat 
shares. We argue above against predicting portfolio payoffs ex post, after Nature has told us the 
identity of the randomly chosen formateur but before the government has formed, given the 
problem of identifying the list of exogenously selected formateurs in a way that is not 
endogenous to the bargaining outcome, compounded by the lack of any measurable effect once 
this problem is addressed. We therefore address the paradox by predicting portfolio allocation ex 
ante, absent any knowledge of the formateur, and developing a joint ex ante model of 
government formation and portfolio distribution.  
This leads us to the second question, of whether raw seat shares or theoretical voting weights 
EHWWHU SUHGLFW SDUWLHV¶ REVHUYed portfolio shares. Absent knowledge of the formateur, the 
canonical bargaining models referred to above predict that:  
x payoffs will be proportional to theoretical voting weights;  
x only minimal winning coalitions will form; (minority cabinets face a majority opposition 
with both the incentive and ability to capture all portfolios; surplus coalitions contain 
members who are not needed yet consume some portfolios);  
x parties with zero MIW will therefore not be part of any government coalition.   
Unlike the canonical bargaining models, the GL prediction that portfolio distribution will reflect 
raw seats shares lacks deep theoretical underpinnings, though several scholars have recently 
addressed this. Anna Bassi assumes that formateurs are not picked exogenously, but emerge 
endogenously from negotiations between party leaders. Her model predicts no formateur 
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advantage (in equilibrium, party leaders bargain this away), and Gamsonian payoffs.19 The latter 
arise because Bassi (p784) assumes any proposed payoff distribution must satisfy the full set of 
party legislators, not just a single party leader. Carroll and Cox model bargaining over 
government formation that begins before an election, not after this. Their argument is that 
committing to Gamsonian payoffs in pre-election deals provides incentives for all parties to the 
deal to expend maximum electoral effort on increasing their legislative seat total, increasing the 
probability that both they and their coalition partners will take office. Falco-Gimenó and 
Indridason argue that *DPVRQLDQSRUWIROLRGLVWULEXWLRQVDFWDVQDWXUDO³IRFDOSRLQWV´ in a difficult 
and complex bargaining environment, involving complicated policy negotiations and many other 
matters besides, thereby taking one piece of complexity off the bargaining table.20 
 Given theoretical arguments on both sides of the debate, it is helpful to resolve 
HPSLULFDOO\WKHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUSDUWLHV¶SRUWIROLRSD\RIIVWHQGWRUHVSRQGWRUaw seat shares 
or their theoretical voting weights. Building on the argument of Falco-Gimenó and Indridason, it 
is also helpful to investigate whether Gamsonsian proportional payoffs become more likely as 
the bargaining environment becomes more complex. We address both of these questions below. 
A joint a priori model of government formation and portfolio distribution 
Until now, all empirical work on portfolio payoffs has predicted these given a particular 
coalition of parties that has already formed.21 In other words, existing empirical work has 
modeled portfolio distribution ex post, conditional on government formation and regardless of 
whether the government that formed was predicted by any model. From a theoretical perspective, 
                                                          
19
 Bassi 2013 
20
 (Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013) 
21
 (Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Snyder et al. 2005; Warwick and Druckman 2006; Laver et al. 2011; Carroll 
and Cox 2007b; Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013)  
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this is despite the fact that bargaining models predict portfolio distribution as an integral part of a 
model of government formation, so that (in)ability to predict government membership is highly 
relevant empirically. In practical terms, ex post modeling of payoff distributions results in 
deletion from the analysis of every party receiving no cabinet portfolio. This happens even when 
the theoretical model under investigation predicts that, on average, many of these parties should 
receive a positive bargaining payoff and should with some positive probability be members of 
the government. Selecting on the dependent variable in this way ignores the possibility that there 
may be complexities in the bargaining process that systematically select different types of party, 
contrary to the claim that parties should receive portfolio payoff solely in proportion to their 
bargaining strength. 
We therefore eschew ex post prediction of portfolio distributions and specify an ex ante 
statistical approach that includes all parties involved in government formation, whether or not 
they join the cabinet and receive a payoff, and evaluates joint predictions of government 
membership and payoff allocation between government members. This is analogous to an 
approach developed recently by Chiba, et al. which develops a statistical model to evaluate joint 
predictions of government formation and government duration.22 
STATISTICAL MODEL  
Our unit of analysis is a political party in a government formation situation. Our dependent 
variable is the SDUW\¶V observed share of cabinet portfolios. This ranges in theory from 0 to 1, and 
has a point mass at zero in empirical data. A party with zero cabinet portfolios is by all 
conventional definitions considered not to be a member of the government; a party with non-zero 
portfolios is considered to be a government member; a party with all the portfolios constitutes a 
                                                          
22
 (Chiba et al. 2014) 
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single party cabinet. Thus, our dependent variable is far from normally distributed. While we 
present results of OLS regressions in supplementary materials, to facilitate comparison with 
previously published work, our core method involves maximum likelihood models based on a 
mixed continuous±discrete distribution. The dependent variable is a proportion and therefore has 
a limited range. This suggests the choice of a beta distribution, which is flexible enough to suit 
the problem (see Brehm and Gates on this topic).23 As a continuous function, however, it is not 
appropriate for modeling large numbers of values that are at a single point, and the dependent 
variable has a very large number of zeros, which arise whenever a given party is not included in 
the government. This implies using a mixed distribution. We adopt this approach, following 
work by Ospina and Ferrari,24 and model these data as a mixture between a beta distribution and 
a degenerate distribution in 0. By using a zero-inflated beta model such as this, we directly 
model both the likelihood a party enters a coalition or not, and then, upon entry, its payoff in 
cabinet seats. Hence, the likelihood function we maximize is: ܮሺݕǢ ߥǡ ߤǡ ߪሻ ൌ   ? ߥ௜ଵିூሺ௬೔ሻሺ ? െ ߥ௜ሻூሺ௬೔ሻ௡௜ୀଵ  ? ୻ሺఙ೔ሻ୻ሺఓ೔ఙ೔ሻ୻൫ሺଵିఓ೔ሻఙ೔൯ ݕ௜ఓ೔ఙ೔ିଵሺ ? െ ݕ௜ሻሺଵିఓ೔ሻఙ೔ିଵ௜ǣ௬೔אሺ଴ǡଵሻ , 
 
«ZKHUH ߥ௜ ൌ ቀ ఉഌబାఉഌభ ?௠௜௪௦௛௔௥௘೔ାఉഌమ ?௦௘௔௧௦௛௔௥௘೔ଵିሺఉഌబାఉഌభ ?௠௜௪௦௛௔௥௘೔ାఉഌమ ?௦௘௔௧௦௛௔௥௘೔ሻቁ, ߤ௜ ൌ ൬ ఉഋబାఉഋభ ?௠௜௪௦௛௔௥௘೔ାఉഋమ ?௦௘௔௧௦௛௔௥௘೔ଵିሺఉഋబାఉഋభ ?௠௜௪௦௛௔௥௘೔ାఉഋమ ?௦௘௔௧௦௛௔௥௘೔ሻ൰, ߪ௜ ൌ ሺߚఙ଴ ൅ ߚఙଵ  ? ݉݅ݓݏ݄ܽݎ௜݁ ൅ ߚఙଶ  ? ݏ݁ܽݐݏ݄ܽݎ௜݁ሻ 
 
 
Link functions were chosen to constrain parameters to the unit interval (in the case of Ȟi and µ i) 
and to be strictly positive in the case of the precision parameter ıi.  The parameter Ȟi has a direct 
                                                          
23
 Brehm and Gates, 1993. 
24
 Ospina and Ferrari, 2012. :HFRXOGHPSOR\DPRUHFRPSOLFDWHGPRGHOWKDWLQFOXGHVRQH¶VLH
governments where a single party forms the governments, despite the fact that this party does not have a 
majority of seats in the parliament), but there are very few observations where this occurs. 
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and relevant substantive interpretation: it gives the likelihood of a zero observation, hence the 
inverse likelihood of cabinet membership. The parameter µ i is the mean for the beta distribution 
and shows the strength of the relationship between the independent variables and the party 
portfolio shares; ıi is the precision of the beta distribution. We thereby achieve our core objective 
of deriving distinct joint estimates of the probability of cabinet membership, vi, and the 
distribution of cabinet portfolios, µ i.  
Weighting cases 
Since our unit of analysis is a political party in a government formation situation, we might ask 
whether all observations in the data should, as in all previous empirical analyses, have equal 
weight. Different countries have different numbers of parties and some have many more 
governments than others. Italy, for example, had more governments than most other European 
countries in the post-war era and also tends to have more parties than most other countries. The 
dataset we describe below covers 16 countries, but Italy accounts for about 22% of the 
observations. Italy, Belgium, Denmark, and Finland together account for about 55% of all 
observations. Empirical analyses that ignore this may be biased, DQGZHGRQ¶WZDQWRXU³FURVV-
QDWLRQDO´ DQDO\VLV RI SRUWIROLR GLVWULEXWLRQ WR EH PRVWO\ DERXW ,WDO\ %HOJLXP 'HQPDUN DQG
Finland. In order to control for the different weights of parties in the estimation due to the 
differences in party system sizes and frequency of elections, we calculated a probability for each 
party to be selected into a subsample of our data.  This selection probability is inversely related 
to the number of parties in parliament. It is calculated as: ߨ௜ ൌ   ?݊௞  ? ?ܭ 
Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multi-party systems / 12 
 
«where nk is the number of parties in a given cabinet k and K is the total number of cabinets in 
the truncated data set. Based on the selection probabilities, 80% of observations (1134 parties) in 
the truncated data set are randomly selected in a subsample.25 By providing results based on 
multiple, randomly drawn samples, we mitigate the possibility that one nation exercises undue 
influence on the results.26  In many respects, our sampling strategy functions like the bootstrap.  
By creating empirical distributions from the data and generating multiple samples (with 
replacement), we hedge against any single nation (or subset of cabinets) having undue influence 
on our results.27 
Estimation approach 
As indicated in the previous section, our estimation method involves creating multiple training 
sets based on the principle of the empirical bootstrap. We use these training sets to test three 
different models.  The first includes all cabinets and is the main test of whether theoretical voting 
weights or raw seat shares best predict outcomes, including both government membership and 
                                                          
25
 We use a threshold of 80% for the training set (and accordingly, 20% for the test set) to insure that the 
test samples are large enough to make reasonable inferences.  Splitting the sample in this way is accepted 
practice in the machine learning literature, though there are more complex ways to accomplish the same 
goals (see, for example, Bishop and Nasrabadi, 2006).   
26
 To provide comparability with previously published results that do not weight cases in this way, we 
SURYLGHXQZHLJKWHG³IODWSL´, boostrapped OLS versions of all key estimates in the online 
supplementary materials (Appendix 3, Tables A3.1 and A3.2).  
27
 We also tried a more aggressive strategy that rebalanced the relative proportions of the various nations 
in the training sets to make them more even. This modified approach did not produce substantively 
different results but is available on request. 
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payoff distribution. Addressing Falco-Gimenó DQG ,QGULGDVRQ¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW *DPVRQLDQ
payoffs are a response by party leaders to bargaining complexity, we test two further models 
using these training data, separating bargaining settings according to their complexity. We 
GLYLGHG³VLPSOH´IURP³FRPSOH[´VHWWLQJVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHGLIILFXOW\RIFDOFXODting the full set of 
2n - 1 coalitions in an n-party system, and therefore of exploring all coalition possibilities, using a 
natural inflection point in the time taken by our computational algorithm to calculate MIWs.   
This led us to specify simple settings as those with fewer than eight pivotal parties and complex 
settings as those with eight or more pivotal parties.28 For the full population of cases, as well as 
those reflecting simple and complex settings, we draw 1000 subsamples from the data set, split 
each subsample into training and test sets and fit the model. Instead of evaluating our model 
performance using the training samples, we report results based only on the 20% out-of-sample 
observations in the test set.29 This is a further hedge against the possibility that results could be 
overfitted to non-systematic elements of the original sample. 
  
DATA 
Most of our data derive from the Parliament and Government Composition Database (Parlgov), 
constructed by Döring, Manow and collaborators.30 This includes election results and 
government formation data for all EU members as well as many OECD countries from 1945 
onwards. Our dataset includes data from 1945 until the most recent available Parlgov data on 
                                                          
28
 A pivotal party P is one with non-zero MIW. For robustness, we examined models setting the 
³FRPSOH[LW\´WKUHVKROGDWRUSLYRWDOSDUWLHVDQGWKHUHVXOWVZHUHVLPLODU  
29
 Given the vanishingly small probability that all members of any cabinet would be selected in all 
samples, this sampling strategy also addresses the methodological issue that the set of party portfolio 
proportions within any given cabinet generate compositional data. 
30
 http://www.parlgov.org 
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cabinet seats for 16 parliamentary democracies in Western Europe.31 While we rely on Parlgov 
for data on elections, seat share, as well as the party of the prime minister, this source does not 
include data on the distribution of cabinet seats between parties and we collected these data from 
a reliable online database.32 Summary statistics are contained in online supplementary materials 
(Appendix 2). 
Theoretical voting weights 
A key independent variable in our analysis FRQFHUQVSDUWLHV¶ MIWs, which Ansolabehere et al. 
use to implement their claim that theoretical voting weights rather than raw seat shares are what 
inform government formation and subsequent portfolio allocation. There is a focused technical 
literature on MIWs, much of it outside mainstream political science.33 Montero has shown, for 
example, that ex post predicted payoffs under the canonical alternating offers bargaining protocol 
DUH SURSRUWLRQDO WR DJHQWV¶ 0,:V34 The vector of MIWs can be surprisingly difficult to 
calculate, especially in systems with more than a few parties. Computationally, as Strauss shows, 
this is because the problem of coalition enumeration is NP-hard, which of course generates 
problems for real politicians as well as for political scientists.35 While Snyder, et al. address this 
by programming a calculator for computing MIWs,36 WKH ³perfect substitutes have the same 
price´ argument they deploy highlights a theoretical distinction drawn by Freixas and Kurz 
                                                          
31
 These countries are: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden.  
32
 The data on the number of cabinet seats were collected from 
http://www.kolumbus.fi/taglarsson/dokumentit/governm2.htm.  
33
 (Freixas and Kurz 2011; Freixas and Molinero 2009a, 2009b; Montero 2002, 2006) 
34
 (Montero 2006) 
35
 (Strauss 2003) 
36
 (Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Snyder et al. 2005) 
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EHWZHHQ ³VLPSOH´ 0,:V DQG ³0,:V SUHVHUYLQJ W\SHV´ At issue is whether mutually 
substitutable parties should be given equal voting weights, as Snyder et al. argue they should. If 
so, we should use ³MIWs SUHVHUYLQJW\SHV´which are constrained so that parties that are perfect 
substitutes have the same voting weights.37 Following Freixas and Kurz, therefore, we replace 
MIWs with MIWs preserving types.38 Solving for these is an application of linear 
programming.39 We programmed and verified our own algorithm and, assuming a simple 
majority winning quota, calculated MIWs preserving types from party seat totals reported in 
Parlgov. 
Single party majorities and minority governments 
When a single political party wins a legislative majority, models of government formation 
invariably converge on the prediction that it will form a single party government and award itself 
all cabinet portfolios. This is almost invariably true empirically and is not an open theoretical 
question. While we might think of plausible models that treat single party majority governments 
as coalitions of party factions, this is neither the focus of the literature with which we are dealing 
                                                          
37
 (Freixas and Kurz 2011) )UHL[DVDQG.XU]QRWHWKLVSUREOHPLVHVSHFLDOO\DFXWHZLWK³QRQ-
KRPRJHQRXV´YRWLQJJDPHVDQGFDQRFFXUZLWKDVIHZDVHLJKWSDUWLHV³1RQ-KRPRJHQRXV´YRWLQJJDPHV
are those for which all MWCs do not have the same aggregate MIW. For example in the legislature (8: 
4,3,3,2,2), expressed in MIWs, the coalitions (4,2,2), (4,3,2) and (4,3,3) are all MWCs, but each has a 
different aggregate MIW. Theoretical complications arise because a party with MIW 2 in this example 
can substitute in an MWC for a party with weight 3. Laver et al. (2011) find that non-homogenous voting 
games arise in about one-third of real legislatures in the Snyder et al. replication dataset, so this is a non-
trivial issue. 
38
 For stylistic reasons, we refer to these weights as MIWs in what follows.  The Freixas and Kurz 
definition should, in our opinion, be universally adopted. 
39 See Appendix 1 in online supplementary materials 
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nor our focus in this paper. We therefore exclude from our analysis, as uninformative for our 
purposes, settings in which a single party won a legislative majority.  
Minority cabinets pose a more difficult challenge for a joint model of government 
formation and portfolio distribution. Predicting the formation of minority governments remains a 
wide open theoretical question for models of government formation. But models focusing on 
portfolio distribution predict no minority governments, as we have noted, since a minority 
government faces a majority opposition both willing and able to consume all portfolios. To 
include minority governments in our analysis is thus to include a set of cases where we know the 
models of portfolio distribution we are evaluating make failed predictions, and it is not at all 
clear what portfolio distributions these models predict in cabinets they deem out of equilibrium. 
To exclude minority cabinets, however, amounts to selecting on the dependent variable for a 
model that jointly predicts government formation and portfolio distribution, and to include an 
indicator variable for minority governments on the right hand side of the relevant regressions 
violates our objective of ex ante prediction. Since our goal of ex ante prediction is paramount 
and we do not wish to select on the independent variable, we opt for the lesser of two evils and 
include all cases of minority coalitions in our analysis.40 
RESULTS 
Estimation results are reported in Tables 1 ± 3 below; these include all observations except those 
where a single party forms the government.41 The first parameter of interest is Ȟ showing the 
                                                          
40
 Results for models that exclude minority governments are available on request.  In broad terms, and 
unsurprisingly, excluding minority governments improves overall model fit, though only by a small 
margin.  The effects for the variables of interest ± MIWs and raw seat shares ± remain the same. 
41
 As noted, we exclude cases where one party receives a simple majority of the seats in the parliament.  A 
much smaller subset of exclusions (75 observations) concerns observations where a single minority party 
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relationship between the independent variables and a party being out of office (having no 
portfolio). The second parameter is µ, showing the relationship between the independent 
variables and the strictly positive proportion of portfolios allocated to a party. Taking all cases 
together (Table 1), both the MIW and raw legislative seat share of a party are correlated with its 
inclusion in government.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of 1000 parameter estimates and root mean squared error: 




Mean Std. Dev. 
Ȟ  (cabinet membership) Intercept 1.95 .04 
 MIW -5.75 .45 
 Raw Weights -2.94 .35 
µ (portfolio share) Intercept -2.14 .02 
 MIW 1.32 .14 
 Raw Weights 5.43 .13 
ı Intercept 3.33 .06 
 MIW 0.15 .50 
 Raw Weights -2.51 .43 
 RMSE 0.16 .003 
 
The v coefficients show a negative relationship between exclusion from office for both MIWs 
and raw seat shares; higher MIWs are more strongly connected with cabinet membership than 
KLJKHUUDZVHDWVKDUHV+RZHYHUDQGFRQVLVWHQWZLWK:DUZLFNDQG'UXFNPDQ¶VILQGLQJVWKH µ  
coefficients in Table 1 show that raw seats share are far better predictors than MIWs of the share 
of cabinet portfolios a party receives, conditional on it being in the government at all.  
Our analysis therefore yields an unambiguous substantive finding about legislative 
bargaining. Independent of raw legislative seat shares, parties are more likely to get into the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
receives all portfolios, since these do not conform to the assumptions of a zero-inflated beta model. We 
do however include such cases in the, substantively similar, results estimated using OLS regressions and 
reported in Appendix 3 of the online supplementary materials (Tables 5 and 6). 
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cabinet if they have a higher theoretical voting weight, measured using MIWs. Theoretical 
bargaining models do in this sense add value to predictions about cabinet membership. Once a 
party is in the government, however, its payoff, measured as its share of cabinet portfolios, is 
predicted by its raw legislative seat share and not at all by its theoretical bargaining weight. In 
WKLVSUHFLVHVHQVHWKHHPSLULFDOUREXVWQHVVRI*DPVRQ¶V/DZKDVagain been vindicated. While 
raw seat shares robustly predict portfolio distribution, they do not do this because they are 
associated with theoretical voting weights.  
 Comparing Tables 2 and 3, we see that bargaining complexity has a strong effect. In the 
more complex settings described in Table 3, the v coefficients show that MIWs no longer even 
predict cabinet membership, which is much better predicted by raw legislative seat shares. Table 
2 shows the reverse for less complex settings, bearing in mind these are the typical settings for 
post-war Western Europe; membership of the government is much better predicted by MIWs, 
controlling for raw legislative seat shares. In both types of setting, however, the µ coefficients 
show that it is raw legislative seat shares, and not MIWs, that predict portfolio payoffs. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of 1000 parameter estimates and root mean squared error 




Mean Std. Dev.  
 v Intercept 2.31 .08  
  MIW -8.14 .58  
  Raw Weights -1.42 .45  
 µ Intercept -1.83 .06  
  MIW 0.73 .32  
  Raw Weights 4.91 .19  
 ı Intercept 2.70 .18  
  MIW 4.01 1.14  
  Raw Weights -4.41 .71  
  RMSE .18 .004  
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Table 3: Distribution of 1000 parameter estimates and root mean squared error 




Mean Std. Dev.  
 v Intercept 1.89 .05  
  MIW -4.19 .80  
  Raw Weights -5.13 .63  
 µ Intercept -2.25 .02  
  MIW -0.02 .21  
  Raw Weights 7.17 .20  
 ı Intercept 3.46 .07  
  MIW -1.80 .80  
  Raw Weights 0.35 .69  
  RMSE .116 .004  
 
To facilitate comparison with previously published results, we present estimates derived 
from OLS regressions in the online supplementary materials (Appendix 3), with the caveat these 
models are mis-specified for reasons we discuss above. The OLS estimates comport with those 
derived from zero inflated beta models presented here. Theoretical voting weights predict 
government membership, especially in the lower complexity settings with eight or fewer pivotal 
parties.  But it is raw legislative seats, not MIWs, which predict distributions of cabinet 
portfolios within a given coalition.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Our zero-inflated beta model jointly estimates membership of the government and, conditional 
on this, the distribution of cabinet portfolios between government members. The results are 
unambiguous. First, controlling for raw legislative seat shares, the theoretical voting weights 
used by non-cooperative models of legislative bargaining do predict membership of the 
government emerging from bargaining between parties, especially in settings with fewer than 
eight pivotal parties that are typical in postwar Western Europe. Indeed Table 1 shows that 
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theoretical voting weights predict government membership much better than raw seat shares in 
this common setting. In a nutshell, controlling for raw seat shares, parties with higher theoretical 
voting weights are better able to force their way into government coalitions. This is a 
theoretically significant empirical finding. Second, whatever the setting and conditional on the 
government that forms, raw legislative seat shares, not theoretical voting weights, predict the 
distribution of cabinet portfolios between government parties. The latter finding is, in effect, a 
further replication RI WKH UREXVW *DPVRQ¶V /DZ UHVXlts using a more sophisticated and 
appropriate statistical apparatus. Third, Tables 2 and 3 show that, while MIWs predict cabinet 
membership in simple bargaining settings, they are much less effective than raw seat shares at 
predicting cabinet membership in more complex settings. 
 We draw the following conclusions from these findings. First, our findings imply that the 
scientific community should accept and exploit the robust empirical regularity that raw seat 
shares and not theoretical voting weights predict the distribution of cabinet portfolios in 
European governments. The theoretical task is not to make this empirical result go away but to 
find a rigorous theoretical model of government formation that explains it. Second, and newly 
emerging from our joint modeling of government membership and portfolio distribution, the 
good news for legislative bargaining models is that theoretical voting weights, more precisely 
MIWs preserving types, do help to explain government membership.  
We see no necessary contradiction between these findings. One way to reconcile them is 
to infer that the distribution of cabinet portfolios is neither the only, nor even the most important, 
matter that concerns party leaders bargaining over the formation of coalition cabinets. *ROGHU¶V
analysis of bargaining delays over government formation in western Europe shows that, in post-
electoral settings, these delays range from 86 days on average in the Netherlands though 61 days 
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in Belgium to less than three days in Norway.42 One recent Belgian government took more than a 
year to form. Informal press reports of what is actually happening during these often lengthy 
bargaining periods suggest that the party leaders are not spending their time bargaining over the 
distribution of cabinet portfolios, but rather are trying to negotiate a joint policy program for 
government that reconciles conflicting party manifestos. This is detailed and time consuming 
work, and it appears from these reports that party leaders typically turn to the distribution of 
cabinet portfolios only after a joint policy program has been agreed. For us to go further would 
require setting out a model of bargaining over government formation that takes account of both 
portfolio distribution and the need for a joint policy program. This is clearly not our task in this 
paper though we are exploring it in ongoing work. Our point here, simply put, is that our twin 
empirical findings can be reconciled if portfolio distribution is not the only payoff that concerns 
party leaders when they bargain over government formation. If it were, then we would expect 
SDUWLHV¶WKHRretical voting weights to predict portfolio distribution, but they do not. Rather, while 
these voting weights have a significant bearing on who gets into government, the distribution of 
portfolios between the parties in government very systematically conforms to a norm of 
proportionality with raw legislative seat shares. 
 
                                                          
42
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 APPENDIX 1 
 
As with any algorithm for calculating MIWs, we must first generate all minimum winning 




Solving for MIWs is a straightforward application of linear programming and we use the PuLP 
library to implement our algorithm (http://packages.python.org/PuLP/).1 
 
  
                                                          
1
 For the best verbal description of the algorithm, see Strauss (2003).  His code is not, however, open-source, 
though the java program can be run from http://www.mindlessphilosopher.net/weights/.  Our version of the 
algorithm chooses a slightly different set of assumptions than Strauss (see p. 6 of this paper), is not prone to 
mistakes, but is slower for very large numbers of parties. Our code is available from the authors. 
APPENDIX 2 
Table A2.1: Descriptive statistics of key variables 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
cabinet_seat_share 3729 0.127393 0.250542 0 1 
seats_share 3737 0.133264 0.14457 0.001518 0.635812 
miw_share 3709 0.132549 0.164013 0 1 
election_year 3737 1977.327 18.53296 1939 2011 
bicameral 3737 0.618411 0.485842 0 1 
 
APPENDIX 3 
To facilitate comparison with previously published results, we now present estimates derived 
from OLS regressions and including all observations used in other studies ± despite the fact that 
these models are mis-specified for the reasons we have given. The OLS estimates in Tables A 
3.1 and A3.2 are largely in accord with the zero inflated beta models presented above, but a few 
additional details are worth pointing out.  Support for the role played by the two independent 
variables of interHVWLH0,:¶VDQGUDZZHLJKWVLVSURYLGHGE\WKHEootstrapped estimates in 
Table A3.1 which GHPRQVWUDWHVWKDW0,:¶VDUHLQIDct utilized by parties when one includes both 
stages of bargaining (i.e., admission to a coalition and then the subsequent division of 
perquisites).  Table A3.2, accordinglyVKRZVWKDW0,:¶VDUHIDUOHVVSUHGLFWLYHRIFDELQHWVHDW
allocations once one constrains the sample, as previous work has done, to only those parties that 
are in the government.  In qualitative terms, this supports our contention WKDW 0,:¶V SUHGLFW
entry to coalitions, especially in the low complexity case of eight or fewer effective parties.  But, 
raw weights are dominant in predicting seat shares once the coalition is established.   
 
  
Table A3.1: OLS Regression Full Sample 
Bootstrap       N 3701 
Replications 1000 
  
Wald chi2(4) 2724.47 
  















   
Root MSE 0.164 
  
    
  
DV: cabinet_share Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
miw_share 0.72959 0.033393 21.85 0  0.6641414   0.7950377 
seats_share 0.548392 0.045642 12.01 0  0.4589345   0.6378494 
italy 0.010611 0.024198 0.44 0.661 -0.0368161   0.0580389 
bicameral 0.009772 0.005844 1.67 0.094 -0.0016814   0.0212252 
_cons -0.0485 0.004868 -9.96 0 -0.0580426  -0.0389625 
 
 
Table A3.2: OLS Regression excluding non-cabinet members   
 
Bootstrap        Number of obs 1137 
Replications 1000     Wald chi2(4) 4059.16 
        Prob > chi
2
 0 









   
Root MSE 0.142 
  
    
  
DV: cabinet_share Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
miw_share 0.199748 0.038367 5.21 0  0.124549    0.2749466 
seats_share 1.347314 0.054709 24.63 0  1.240086    1.454541 
italy 0.026754 0.03744 0.71 0.475 -0.0466275   0.1001354 
bicameral -0.03683 0.009039 -4.07 0 -0.0545451  -0.0191141 
_cons 0.071515 0.00835 8.56 0  0.0551486   0.0878817 
 
 
